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EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS VERSUS PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 
A Comparative Analysis in Portugal 
Abstract 
This study compares the effects of private versus public school administration on student 
performance in Portugal, which benefits from the existence of publicly funded private schools 
(CA schools). We have constructed two measures of students’ achievements in order to 
compare the effectiveness of each type of class. Firstly, a Logit is used to estimate the 
probability of completing Lower Secondary School (7th to 9th grade) in three years. Secondly, 
we employ a Value-Added approach by OLS, to compare national exam scores at 9th grade. 
Our findings suggest a positive, but modest, increase in the probability of completing Lower 
Secondary School with zero retentions, for those students attending a publicly funded private 
class from 7th grade to 9th grade, when compared to those attending a strictly public class. 
Additionally, the results suggest that attending a publicly funded private class also increases 
national exam scores by 1 point in Portuguese subject and 3 points in Mathematics, when 
compared to strictly public class (0-100 scale). With regard to private classes, in both models, 
the results move in the same direction as publicly funded private classes, although with higher 
magnitudes, when compared to public classes. 
Keywords: publicly funded private schools; effectiveness; value-added; national exams 
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Despite the motivation for the existence of public-private partnerships in school systems 
being the improvement of learning outcomes of students (Flaker, 2014), in Portugal the so-
called “Contratos de Associação” were implemented due to the lack of public school 
provision in some specific geographic areas, which meant that not all students were given the 
opportunity to benefit from public government-financed education. Accordingly, instead of 
creating new infrastructures that would require more time and money, the Portuguese 
Ministry of Education came up with the following solution: the funding of education in 
certain private schools to ensure education was available to everyone who had enrolled in the 
public-school network. However, more recently the Portuguese government has been 
conducting educational reforms, by reducing the number of classes under these contracts, thus 
reallocating students to regular public schools1. Are students in publicly funded private 
schools getting worse results? If so, is this caused by the different property management 
schemes? These are some of the questions we will address during this study. 
The fundamental advantage, for a researcher, of the coexistence of publicly funded private 
schools, regular public schools and strictly private schools in Portugal, as mentioned by 
Rosado and Seabra (2015), is that we have two groups of students - from publicly funded 
private schools and regular public schools - that are more homogeneous with respect to family 
income when compared to a third group of students from strictly private schools, who tend to 
come from wealthier families2. Strictly private schools and publicly funded private schools 
have more freedom in terms of staff hiring decisions, while regular public schools are obliged 
                                                          
1 “Contratos de Associação” are pluriannual contracts signed between the government and private schools at the 
beginning of each school cycle, meaning that a new class established in the 7th grade in 2009/10 in a publicly 
funded private school will be financed for at least three years, until the 9th grade, even though the government 
may choose not to finance new 7th grade classes in 2010/11 in that publicly funded private school 
2 In this study we use subsidies awarded to families based on aggregate income and family composition as a 
proxy for family income 
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to follow centralized state decisions. Therefore, a comparison between regular public school 
and publicly funded private school students may be the best way to isolate the impact of 
property management schemes on students’ educational outcomes. Hence, this will be the 
primary goal of this research as both public and publicly funded private schools constitute two 
freely available educational alternatives. Thus, we will add our contribution to the somewhat 
scarce literature currently available in Portugal regarding the effectiveness of publicly funded 
private schools. Nonetheless, we will still look at the differences between studying in strictly 
private schools, at class level, as compared with studying in public schools, whilst 
acknowledging the differences in family background between students in both types of 
schools. For simplicity, henceforth we will refer to strictly private schools, strictly public 
schools and publicly funded private schools as private schools, public schools and CA 
schools, respectively, within the Portuguese context. 
This study extends the work of Rosado and Seabra (2015) by using a richer dataset. We resort 
to a cohort of students at the 6th grade in the academic year of 2011/12 and observe their 
academic achievement both in terms of the time required to finish Lower Secondary School 
(9th grade) and the Mathematics and Portuguese language standardized test scores obtained in 
the 9th grade. We then use a Logit Model to estimate the probability of being retained at least 
once. We also implement a Value-Added approach for the exam scores, using 6th grade 
national exams as the baseline. This second approach is quite often used in Economics of 
Education to account for the cumulative effects of prior education inputs on current 
achievement level (Sass, 2006). 
We find a positive contribution from private administration in both models. In particular, 
ceteris paribus, belonging to a CA class, increases the probability of completing 7th – 9th 
grade with zero retentions by 1.05% relative to belonging to a public class. This effect is 
much larger when considering private classes, approximately 9.47%. Additionally, the results 
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suggest that belonging to a CA class or a private class, ceteris paribus, also increases national 
exam scores by 1.3 or 6.75 points in Portuguese subject and 3.2 or 8.4 points in Mathematics, 
respectively, relative to public class scores. 
The structure of this research is organized in the following manner: Section II is devoted to 
Literature Review; Section III presents some facts about the Portuguese Education System 
and the nature of Contratos de Assosiação (CA); Section IV describes the data, the variables 
used throughout the study and the group decomposition of each type of school; Section V 
reports the methodology used; Section VI is devoted to results obtained and robustness 
checks; and finally the last Section VII is dedicated to our conclusion and policy implications. 
II. Literature review 
The debate around educational funding and school administration is quite extensive and 
comprises decades of research, mainly fostered by attempts to identify whether there are 
significant differences in the public and private school system management. The challenge of 
measuring school quality differences under private and public administrations however, lies in 
separating students’ achievement from differences in students’ background (Hanushek et al., 
2007).  
There is a widespread consensus that students who attend strictly private schools tend to come 
from more privileged socioeconomic backgrounds, since the high tuition fees encountered in 
these schools impose a financial barrier to many families (Mancebón et al., 2010; Flaker, 
2014), thereby generating a self-selection problem that may bias the results of private school 
attendees. In general, the direction of the selection bias is in favor of private school students. 
As Hanushek et al. (2015) stated, differences in early experiences in childhood (pre-school), 
which are closely linked to family background, may explain differences in students’ 
achievement at school. Students who are given opportunities and incentives to develop 
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cognitive and non-cognitive skills earlier in life tend to come from wealthier families. Their 
parents are also generally more educated and tend to enrol their children in private schools, 
and thus the direction of the bias will be in favour of private schools. 
However, it might be the case that the bias from self-selection into some types of private 
schools is downwards. Noell (2012) in a reanalysis of the ‘Public and Private’ by Coleman et 
al., corrected self-selection into Catholic schools using an Instrumental Variable of students’ 
religious identification as Catholic. Noell reports a negative bias of the impact of Catholic 
school attendance on sophomore reading score tests implemented in different states of USA, 
caused by unmeasured factors which affect both school choice and students’ achievement.  
Given Noell’s findings, it is possible that, despite the extensive controls used for students’ 
backgrounds, there may exist other unmeasured factors in self-selection into the private sector 
that are correlated with higher achievement (Coleman, Kilgore and Hoffer, 1982), in 
particular the  factor of students’ ability. This in fact, sparked many different reactions against 
the apparent superiority of private school system administration. 
Epple and Romano (2002) provide evidence that private schools practice cream-skimming by 
accepting students based on income and ability stratification, i.e. to retain the most able 
students and encourage transfer or even drop-out - of low performing students, thus implying 
that private school results are upwardly biased.  
Jimenez, Lockheed and Paqueo, (1991), advocate that since private schools must compete for 
students to remain financially viable, and given their autonomy and freedom to adjust to the 
needs of students and parents, the right incentives are in place to manage resources and staff 
in the most effective and efficient way. Hence, the free market competition promotes 




Focusing now on the empirical findings regarding effectiveness of publicly funded private 
schools, Rosado and Seabra (2015) evaluate the relative performance of public versus private 
schools in Portugal, using publicly funded private schools to isolate the impact of background 
from the property and management school schemes. Employing cross-section data to compare 
students at the 9th grade in 2010, they find a positive effect of private ownership in students’ 
performance in national exams. After controlling for students’ individual characteristics e.g. 
age and gender, and background (the latter mainly district controls), belonging to a publicly 
funded private school increases the probability of passing the 9th grade national exam by 
2.34% for Mathematics and by 2.06% for Portuguese subject, when compared to a public 
school. However, when considering the impact of school administration on students’ 
consistency over academic years, being in a publicly funded private school decreases by 
0.79% the probability of reaching 9th grade without any retention; increases by 0.68% the 
probability of being retained once; and increases by 0.11% the probability of being retained 
more than once when compared to public schools. The advantage of the current study is that 
we have a richer dataset, since it is possible to observe students in different periods, thus 
controlling for past historical education inputs (prior achievement scores). Nevertheless, the 
overall results are similar. 
Mancebón et al. (2010), conduct a non-parametric efficiency analysis (Data Envelopment 
Analysis) in the context of public and publicly funded private schools in Spain, using 
microdata from PISA 2006 on science competencies. After controlling for students’ 
background and school resources, and after removing individual management inefficiencies, 
they find that public schools are more efficient than publicly funded private schools, i.e. 
students in public schools have better results than publicly funded private schools in science 
PISA scores, while the former use equal or fewer resources than the latter. 
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Some countries have Charter schools, another type of school choice program that differs 
mainly in school administration, given that they can be either privately or publicly owned and 
managed. Charter schools are publicly funded and foster student learning by promoting 
educational innovation while allowing more autonomy and freedom with regards to school 
governance (Robert Bifulco, 2006). Flaker (2014) using data from students in the 8th grade in 
Massachusetts, reports that Charter schools outperform traditional public schools in 
schoolwide proficiency scores in both math and reading, whilst being more efficient in doing 
so, i.e. spending less money per student. Note, however, that even though Flacker 
disaggregated data by community type to control for variation between urban and non-urban 
systems, this was an observational study and thus the author did not consider different student 
characteristics, prior ability nor family background, raising concerns about the results 
obtained due to selection bias. 
Similarly to what Mancebón et al. (2010) did in Spain, Grosskopf, Hayes and Taylor (2009) 
employ a non-parametric approach (DEA) to compare efficiency of Charter schools relative to 
traditional public schools in Texas, for students in elementary grades at metropolitan or 
micropolitan areas during the 2001/02 school year. They find that Charter schools are more 
technically efficient than traditional public schools, i.e. Charter schools produce better 
outcomes - such as net improvements in math and reading standardized tests - using the same 
or fewer resources than traditional public schools. 
III. Portuguese Education System & Contratos de Associação 
In Portugal, since 20093, education is mandatory until the 12th grade and is divided in two 
different stages: Ensino Básico and Ensino Secundário. The former comprises three school 
cycles: 1º Ciclo – 1st to 4th grade; 2º Ciclo – 5th and 6th grade; 3º Ciclo – 7th to 9th grade. 
                                                          
3 Portuguese Law nr.85/2009 of 27th August (Article nr.1 and nr.2) 
8 
 
Ensino Secundário comprises 10th to 12th grade and corresponds to the last school cycle 
before higher education, which is not compulsory. In the scope period of this study (2011/12-
2015/16), students were required to complete national exams for Portuguese and Mathematics 
subjects at the end of 4th, 6th, 9th and 12th grades, each with different weights for final 
evaluation of the student. We will use national exams taken in both subjects at the 6th grade as 
our past achievement control, and those taken at the 9th grade in order to compare scores 
between students in different types of schools. 
Regarding Contratos de Associação, these are pluriannual contracts established by the 
government with private schools to guarantee public education, free of tuition fees, in areas in 
which the provision of public schools is scarce (or non-existent)4. The first law providing the 
basis for these contracts dates back to 19805, when Portugal experienced a change in the law 
which extended mandatory schooling until the 9th grade6, and established public funding at the 
individual level which was consistent with the amount spent in public schools with the same 
level and equivalent degree of education. From 2015/16, the government decided to publicly 
fund private schools at the class level, allocating 80.500€ per class and per academic year. 
Private school students who enrol are subject to the criteria defined by private agents, whilst 
in both public schools and CA schools, students who apply to benefit from public education 
are assigned based on their residential area and - subject to the maximum school capacity - are 
able to rank their school choice preferences7.    
With regard to teachers’ hiring and allocation, private schools and CA schools have freedom 
to hire teachers in accordance with their own criteria. In public schools the school principal 
                                                          
4 In Portugal there are other types of contracts between private schools and the government that are not 
addressed in this study, namely Contratos Simples, Contratos de Patrocínio, Contratos de Desenvolvimento 
5 Portuguese Decree-Law nr.553/80 of 21th November (Article nr.14-16) 
6 Portuguese Law nr.45/86 of 14th October (Article nr.6) 
7 Interestingly, students who apply to a certain school and whose sibling(s) are already studying there have 
priority; a possible explanation could be to facilitate transportation among the household 
9 
 
does not exert that function, it being the responsibility of the Ministry of Education’s to 
allocate teachers based on their preferences, experience and grades upon graduation (Ferreira, 
2015). 
IV. Data, Variables & Group Decomposition 
The data used in this study belongs to the DGEEC8 (Direção-Geral de Estatísticas da 
Educação e Ciência) from the Portuguese Ministry of Science and Education (MEC). From 
this dataset, which contains the entire population in Portugal from the 1st grade up to the 12th 
grade with respect to students, teachers and schools, we retrieved information distributed 
among two distinguishable groups of variables, which we will refer to as ‘vector regressors’ 
in the Analytical Framework section.  
The first group of variables concerns students’ individual characteristics including gender, age 
and nationality. Additionally, we built a proxy for family income, Familysubsidy, which is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the student’s family received social support from the 
Portuguese Social Security. Regarding the validity of this proxy, we argue that it is closely 
linked with socio-economic status since social support is awarded on the basis of family 
aggregate income, family composition (i.e. number of children), and the student’s current 
employment status. Nevertheless, it may not, by itself, be sufficient to control for family 
background. Hence, in the ‘robustness tests’ section for the validity of the results obtained, we 
will add more controls for family background, namely Parent’s Secondary Education and 
Higher Education, and additionally two dummy variables if the student has home access to 
Computer and Internet9.  
                                                          
8 DGGEC is the entity responsible for collecting, monitoring, treating, producing and releasing statistics with 
regards to the Portuguese education system 
9 Unfortunately, the sample is reduced when we add these variables due to missing variables 
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The second group of variables include a set of school characteristics, such as school district, 
county and type of school or class. We separate school from class, since it is possible that one 
school is not fully financed by the contracts (Contratos de Associação), meaning that there 
will be a mix of CA classes and private classes. Types of school or class, either public, CA or 
private, are dummy variables and will measure the impact of attending a certain type of 
school or class. The description of the variables is summarized in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
Additionally, we use data of Portuguese and Mathematics national exams scores at 6th and 9th 
grades from JNE10 (Júri Nacional de Exames) to construct the measure of students’ 
achievement with the Value-Added approach, with 9th grade exam being the output variable, 
and 6th grade exam the baseline of the student11. 
The dataset starts at the academic year 2006/07 and continues until the academic year 
2015/16. However, because national exams (Portuguese and Mathematics) taken at the 6th 
grade only started being reported on a scale from 0-100 in the academic year 2011/1212, we 
decided to restrict the sample and take the cohort of students at the 6th grade who performed 
both Portuguese and Mathematics national exams in the academic year 2011/12, as our 
starting point. Further, we develop two models to compare the effectiveness of each school 
regime with respect to students’ consistency over the years and students’ performance at 
national exams.   
In the analysis, only students from the Portuguese mainland in the regular academic track 
were considered. In addition, it was necessary to observe, initially, students in the three grades 
                                                          
10 JNE is integrated into the DGE (Direção-Geral da Educação) and is responsible for coordinating, planning and 
executting final cycle exams, national final examinations, school-level examinations equivalent to national tests, 
equivalence tests for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd cycles of basic education (Básico) and secondary education 
(Secundário)  
11 Notice that there are two phases of national exam scores in the same academic year, and the data collected 
corresponds to the 1st exam phase taken by the student unless it is missing (in that case it will be the 2nd exam 
phase taken) 
12 Prior to this school year national exams were classified and reported on a scale 1-5, therefore losing variability 
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of Lower Secondary School (7th, 8th, and 9th) to record the time required for graduation. 
However, this was not necessary for students who were retained at least once in 7th or 8th 
grade, as they would automatically take more than three years to finish 7th to 9th grade. 
Moreover, for the Value-Added approach, we required that each student had both Portuguese 
and Mathematics national exam at 9th grade. Hence, we start by considering the type of class 
at 7th grade for the achievement measure of the Probability of Graduation on Time, and the 
type of class at 9th grade for the achievement measure constructed by the Value-Added 
approach. After excluding students for whom we do not observe the 9th grade exam scores, we 
look at the impact of attending the same class type throughout the three grades (in both 
models), e.g. studying the impact of attending 7th, 8th and 9th grade in a CA class. 
Descriptive Statistics  
In this subsection, we compare students from different types of classes. 
According to the DGEEC’s report for the school year 2011/12, there were 119 758 students 
enrolled at the 6th grade in mainland Portugal. Of these students, 104 410 were in public 
schools, 8 323 were in publicly funded private schools (including CA schools) and 7 025 were 
enrolled in private schools.  
Our Complete Sample of 89 572 individuals that have both Portuguese and Mathematics 
national exams at the 6th grade in the school year 2011/12, and that we can follow at 7th grade, 
represent 74.79% of the total student population. Further ahead, we create a sub-sample of 75 
879 individuals which we can follow until the 9th grade. At this point, it is important to point 
out that the Restricted Sample contains only students that completed Lower Secondary School 
in three or four years, since our dataset’s last school year ends at 2015/16, thus caution is 
necessary when interpreting the results. 
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From Table 1 below we confirm Rosado and Seabra's (2015) statement that students from 
public schools, i.e. those studying in public classes, are closer to their peers in CA classes, in 
Portugal, with respect to family income, - as measured by our proxy Familisubsidy - while 
students attending private schools tend to come from wealthier families. For instance, 
considering 7th grade of Complete Sample, the families of 36.98% of students in CA class 
receive social support whereas for students in public class the percentage is 43.67%. On the 
other hand, the families of students studying in private class barely receive social support at 
all (1.02%).  












  7TH GRADE 
TYPE OF SCHOOL CA PRIVATE PUBLIC TOTAL 
N 6 195 4 326 79 051 89 572 
(% Of Students) (6,92%) (4,83%) (88,25%) (100%) 
Student’s Characteristics     
Gender(MALE=1)     
Males 3 169 2 280 39 499 44 948 
Females 3 026 2 046 39 552 44 624 
(% Of Males) (51,15%) (52,70%) (49,97%) (50,18%) 
Nationality(PT=1)     
Portuguese 6 155 4 290 77 175 87 620 
Foreigners 40 36 1 876 1 952 
(% Of Portuguese) (99,35%) 99,17%) (97,63%) (97,82%) 
Family Subsidies(YES=1)     
6TH Grade: YES 2 810 56 42 338 45 204 
NO 3 385 4 270 36 713 44 368 
(% Of Receivers) (45,36%) (1,29%) (53,56%) (50,47%) 
7TH Grade: YES 2 291 44 34 525 36 860 
NO 3 904 4 282 44 526 52 712 
(% Of Receivers) (36,98%) (1,02%) (43,67%) (41,15%) 
Move School (YES=1)     
6TH To 7TH: YES 692 247 21 749 22 688 
NO 5 503 4 079 57 302 66 884 
(% Of Movers) (11,17%) (5,71%) (27,51%) (25,33%) 
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Nevertheless, from 8th grade onwards the percentage of private school students receiving 
social support increases approximately 13 percentage points (p.p.)13. This is a significant 
increase which reduces the gap between the socio-economic status of private class attendees 
and that of other students14. 
Moving on to the distribution of schools within mainland Portugal, it is possible to identify 
some factors that may affect the comparison between schools. Our private schools’ sample is 
mainly located in two districts e.g. Lisbon and Porto, the two wealthiest and most populous 
districts in Portugal. In Table A.3 in the Appendix - which shows the distribution of schools 
by the type of class they offer, per district, at 7th grade in our sample, there are 60 private 
schools in Lisbon and 36 private schools in Porto, representing 70.6% of all the private 
schools in the sample. Compared to public schools and CA schools - where Lisbon and Porto 
amount for 33.17% and 9.33% of the sample, respectively, there are large distributional 
disparities between the districts. Moreover, with regard to schools’ territorial distribution, 
there are four districts of Portugal in which there are actually no CA schools at all. This is 
due, not to data limitations, but to the nature of the contract itself. 
Regarding pupils’ gender, from the Complete Sample of 89 572 individuals, 50.18% are males 
and the proportion remains stable when we disaggregate data by type of class: 51.15%, 
52.70% and 49.97% are males in CA class, private class and public class, respectively. 
Regarding pupils’ nationality, 97.82% of students in Complete Sample are Portuguese 
whereas the remainder are foreign.  
With regard to students’ mobility between 6th and 7th grade, there are some disparities. 
Considering Complete Sample, students from private class tend to remain in the same school; 
                                                          
13 See Table A.2 in the Appendix for the Restricted Sample 
14 The increase of family subsidy awarded to private class attendees at the 8th grade onwards may be due to the 
existence and effects of the financial crisis during the period in analysis (2011/12-2015/16), or may be due 




only 5.71% moved to a different school. On the other hand, students from public class are 
more prone to move between the 6th and 7th grade, with a percentage of 27.51% from the 
sample moving school, while students in CA class fall between the two above with regard to 
mobility, with 11.17% moving school15. 
V. Analytical framework 
Probability of Graduation on Time 
The first measure was constructed to estimate the probability of students completing Lower 
Secondary School - from the 7th to 9th grade, in three years, and thus to evaluate the student’s 
consistency over an extended period, rather than at a single point in time, i.e. when they take 
an exam. 
Consider: 
 𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼𝑿𝒊 + 𝛿𝑭𝒊 + 𝛾𝑺𝒔 + 𝜃𝑨𝒊
𝟔 + 𝛽𝑻𝒊 + 𝑖 (1) 
𝑖 = 1, … , ?̅? ; 
Where 𝐶𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes the value one (1) if the student i completes Lower 
Secondary School (7th to 9th grade) in three years (0 if more than three years). 𝑿𝒊 is a vector of 
student i time-invariant individual characteristics, 𝑭𝒊 is our proxy for family income 
Familysubsidy of student’s i, 𝑺𝒔 is a vector of time-invariant school-characteristics of school 
s. The baseline achievement measure 𝑨𝒊
𝟔 is a vector of student’s i national exam scores at 6th 
grade at Mathematics and Portuguese subjects, that will account for the cumulative effects of 
prior education inputs (Sass, 2006).  
                                                          




Our variable of interest 𝑻𝒊 , is a vector of class type dummies of student i. 𝑖 is the composite 
error. ?̅? is the number of students in the sample. 
Achievement Value-Added Measure  
Following Todd and Wolpin (2003), who constructed a conceptual framework of children’s 
achievement as a cumulative process of knowledge acquisition, we construct an Achievement 
Value-Added measure of students’ performance that uses a baseline achievement measure to 
allow for unobserved input history as well as unobserved initial ability.  
 The focus of this model is the standardized exam scores obtained at 9th grade: 
 𝐴𝑖𝑗
9 = 𝜶𝑿𝒊 + 𝜹𝑭𝒊 + 𝜸𝑺𝒔 + 𝜃𝑨𝒊𝒋
𝟔 + 𝛽𝑻𝒊 + 𝑖 (2) 
𝑖 = 1, … , ?̅? ; 𝑗 = 1, … , ?̅?  
Where 𝐴𝑖𝑗
9  is the 9th grade national exam score of the student i in subject j and the other 
explanatory variables were already defined. ?̅? is the total number of subjects, in this case 
two, Portuguese and Mathematics.  
Similarly, 𝑻𝒊 is a vector of class type dummies of student i. The 𝜷 vector coefficients will 
measure the impact of attending a certain type of class. 
VI. Results 
Probability of Graduation on Time 
We use a Logit to estimate the probability of graduation on time. The estimation results are 
shown in Table 2 below.   
Looking at Column 1 (Complete Sample) of Table 2, we consider students who we have not 
necessarily observed at 9th grade. The difference between Complete Sample and the Restricted 
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Sample is a group of students who took more than four years to complete 7th to 9th grade and 
would therefore appear in the school years after 2015/1616. Why is this relevant? Because 
students that were lost from the Complete Sample (Column 1) to the Restricted Sample 
(Column 2) were, in some way, low achievers. 
Table 2: Marginal effects of the probability of graduation on time 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
SCORE6thMATH 0.00608*** 0.00362*** 0.00357*** 
 (6.63e-05) (6.54e-05) (6.55e-05) 
SCORE6thPT 0.00369*** 0.00263*** 0.00260*** 
 (9.49e-05) (8.67e-05) (8.67e-05) 
FAMILYSUBSIDY7th -0.0387*** -0.0204*** -0.0209*** 
 (0.00233) (0.00208) (0.00208) 
CACLASS7th 0.00699 0.00200 - 
 (0.00508) (0.00426)  
PRIVCLASS7th 0.0836*** 0.0488*** - 
 (0.0102) (0.00867)  
CACLASS7to9th - - 0.0105** 
   (0.00446) 
PRIVCLASS7to9th - - 0.0947*** 
   (0.0122) 
MALE(Male=1) -0.0471*** -0.0268*** -0.0265*** 
 (0.00226) (0.00201) (0.00201) 
AGE6th -0.0383*** -0.0142*** -0.0135*** 
 (0.00203) (0.00208) (0.00207) 
PORTUGUESE(PT=1) -0.0209*** -0.0198*** -0.0185*** 
 (0.00727) (0.00683) (0.00677) 
MOVESCHOOL6to7th -0.00607** 0.00142 0.00150 
 (0.00264) (0.00240) (0.00239) 
School District Dummies YES YES YES 
Observations 89,570 75,879 74,638 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3259 0.2339 0.237 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Thus, we evaluate the percentage of students that we lost from each type of class to see 
whether the reduction of students was evenly distributed having regard to the proportions of 
students in the sample from each of the three types of class. It is confirmed that the reduction 
of students was evenly distributed among the three types of class in the 7th grade, as follows: 
the percentage of students from CA class in the sample increased 0.3 p.p.; from private class 
increased 0.55 p.p.; and from public class decreased 0.85 p.p., i.e. these changes were not 
sufficient to alter significantly the composition of the groups. 
From Column 1 to 2 of Table 2, as we mentioned the difference is merely the sample, as we 
keep the same specification. It is noticeable that the coefficient from the CACLASS7th dummy 
                                                          
16 Despite students in the 9th grade in respect of whom information was missing 
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in Column 1 is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that students from CA class in 
the 7th grade are neither more nor less likely to complete Lower Secondary School in three 
years when compared to pupils from public class. The results persist when we remove low 
achieving students from the sample, given by Column 2. However, in Column 3 we change 
the specification slightly, in order to capture the effects of studying the entire school cycle in 
the same class regime (and not only at 7th grade), measured by the dummy CACLASS7to9th. 
The results change in favor of CA class, suggesting that students from CA class, ceteris 
paribus, are 1.05% more likely to complete 7th to 9th grade in three years when compared to 
public class students, with a positive coefficient significant at 5% level17. 
Focusing on private class, the dummy PRIVCLASS7th has a significant positive effect at a 
level of 1% both in Column 1 with the Complete Sample and in Column 2 with the Restricted 
Sample. Thus, studying in a private class at 7th grade increases the probability by 8.36% and 
4.88%, respectively, of completing Lower Secondary School in three years, when compared 
to studying in a public class. From Column 2 to 3, where the dummy PRIVCLASS7to9th 
captures the effect of studying the three grades in the same class type, belonging to a private 
class, ceteris paribus, increases by 9.47% the probability of reaching 10th grade with zero 
retentions, when compared to a student studying in a public class, and this effect is significant 
at 1% level.  
Therefore, after excluding low achieving students and controlling for prior achievement test 
scores, family income, gender, nationality, student mobility and age at 6th grade, there is 
evidence that both CA class and private class are less likely to retain students once between 
7th and 9th grade, for those students who remain in the same regime throughout all three 
grades, when compared to public class.  
                                                          
17 Note that the sample from Column 2 to Column 3 was reduced to 74 638 students, as not all students from 
Restricted Sample remained in the same regime administration between 7th and 9th grade 
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The effects of the control variables are consistent with the literature, namely the impact of 
family background. Receiving social support at the 7th grade, i.e. belonging to a less wealthy 
family, decreases the probability of reaching 10th grade with zero retentions. The exception to 
the direction of the impact according to the literature, is the dummy for nationality. Being 
Portuguese decreases the probability of completing 7th to 9th grade in three years relative to 
foreign students, and the effect is always significant at 1% level18.  
Concentrating on student mobility from 6th to 7th grade, the impact of moving school in 
Column 1 is negative and significant at 5% level, but it fades away when the sample is 
restricted (Column 2). To conclude, age at 6th grade has a negative impact and is always 
significant at 1% to the probability of success, suggesting that students that have already been 
retained prior to 2011/12, are more likely to be retained again. 
Achievement Value-Added Measure  
The Achievement Value-Added measure was estimated by OLS and the results are shown in 
Table 3. We use robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity. 
Column 1 to 2 (Mathematics Exams) and Column 3 to 4 (Portuguese Exams) from Table 3 
differ in the specification of the time spent in a certain class type. We start by analyzing the 
impact on national exam scores of contemporaneous class type at 9th grade, and then we 
extend the effects of administration to the three grades, from 7th to 9th grade. The sample in 
Column 1 and 3 of Table 3 is equal to Column 2 (Restricted Sample) in Table 2, i.e. students 
who took 9th grade national exams in 2014/15 or 2015/16. As for the sample in Column 2 and 
4 of Table 3 it is equal to Column 3 of Table 2 as expected. 
                                                          
18 Note that the percentages of foreign students in the Complete Sample (Column 1) and Restricted Sample 
(Column 2) are very low (2.18% and 1.84%, respectively) 
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Regarding the results, in all specifications, on average, belonging to a CA class either at 9th 
grade or between 7th and 9th grade, ceteris paribus, increases the national exam score by 
approximately 3.2 points and 1.2 points, for Mathematics and Portuguese subject respectively, 
on a scale of 0-100, when compared to students in public class. The coefficients reported are 
all significant at 1%, and the magnitude of the effect from contemporaneous class type 
attendance (9th grade) is not statistically different from the impact of three school grade class 
type attendance (7th to 9th grade), for both subjects. 
With regard to private class, the results are quite similar in both specifications, although with 
higher magnitudes. Belonging to a private class in the 9th grade, on average, ceteris paribus, 
increases national exam scores by 8.4 points and 6.4 points, for Mathematics and Portuguese 
respectively, when compared to public class. Likewise for CA class, differences in the 
magnitudes of attending private class in three school grades of Lower Secondary School and 
only at 9th grade are minimal19. 
Table 3: Achievement Value-Added estimation results 
VARIABLES (1) MATH (2) MATH (3) PT (4) PT 
     
SCORE6th 0.858*** 0.859*** 0.594*** 0.595*** 
 (0.00295) (0.00297) (0.00316) (0.00318) 
FAMILYSUBSIDY7th -3.297*** -3.304*** -1.993*** -1.992*** 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.0887) (0.0893) 
CACLASS9th 3.225*** - 1.152*** - 
 (0.238)  (0.163)  
PRIVCLASS9th 8.367*** - 6.363*** - 
 (0.249)  (0.196)  
CACLASS7to9th - 3.225*** - 1.285*** 
  (0.247)  (0.169) 
PRIVCLASS7to9th - 8.375*** - 6.576*** 
  (0.256)  (0.201) 
MALE(Male=1) -2.359*** -2.349*** -2.520*** -2.513*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.0826) (0.0832) 
AGE6th -3.238*** -3.242*** -1.865*** -1.882*** 
 (0.143) (0.145) (0.101) (0.101) 
MOVESCHOOL6to7th 0.404*** 0.406*** 0.0634 0.0710 
 (0.142) (0.143) (0.0974) (0.0982) 
PORTUGUESE(PT=1) 1.025** 1.047** 0.680** 0.683** 
 (0.471) (0.474) (0.303) (0.306) 
EXAMYEAR9th (2016=1) -5.518*** -5.415*** -3.658*** -3.602*** 
 (0.202) (0.205) (0.136) (0.137) 
Constant 37.26*** 37.30*** 43.25*** 43.39*** 
 (1.789) (1.804) (1.249) (1.260) 
School District Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 75,879 74,638 75,879 74,638 
R-squared 0.611 0.611 0.440 0.441 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                          
19 The difference for Mathematics subject is zero, whereas for Portuguese subject it is approximately 0.2 points 
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Comparing private classes with CA classes, there is evidence that the former outperforms the 
latter with respect to national exam scores at the 9th grade, in both subjects.  
As with to the results obtained for the first measure of students’ achievement Probability of 
Graduation on Time, we find that the better the results in prior achievement test scores, the 
better the results in national exams at 9th grade. Family subsidy contributes negatively to the 
outcome variable. Additionally, being older at 6th grade or being male also has a negative 
effect upon scores. With respect to nationality, the coefficients point in a different direction, 
suggesting that, on average, ceteris paribus, being a Portuguese student increases 9th grade 
national exam scores compared to foreign students, in both subjects. Intermobility between 
schools from 6th to 7th grade seems to have a positive impact on national exam scores, and is 
significant at 5% level for both subjects. 
Lastly, the dummy variable EXAMYEAR9th which controls for the difficulty of the national 
exams in 2016 compared to 2015, has a negative effect, suggesting that, on average, ceteris 
paribus, national exams in 2016 were more difficult. However, this coefficient also reflects 
the fact that the group of students taking the exam in 2016 was different from the group of 
students taking the exam in 2015. 
Robustness Tests  
In this subsection, we introduce Parents’ Education into our specifications to see whether the 
results are robust. Since Parent’s Education in the dataset was only available for students in 
public schools, we were obliged to search for an alternative to obtain this variable for the 
remaining students (in CA schools and private schools). Hence, we linked our initial sample, 
which was not in public schools during the school grades observed in the current study, to 
other school grades not observed (1st – 5th). Then, we kept only those that were studying in 
public schools prior to 6th grade, in order to collect data regarding Parent’s Education and 
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resources available at home20. From the Complete Sample of 89 572 students, we retained 72 
650. In particular, the composition of the sample is now comprised as follows: 6.14% CA 
class students, 0.88%21 private class students and 92.98% public class students.  
Because Father’s Education and Mother’s Education were strongly correlated, we decided to 
keep Mother’s Education as it presented less missing values. Therefore, in total there are four 
new dummy control variables: M.SECONDARY, M.HIGHEREDUC, COMPUTER and 
INTERNET22, where the prefix “M” stands for Mother. 
In Table A.4 (Appendix), find the results obtained for the Probability of Graduation on 
Time, prior to and after introducing Mother’s Education and Home Resources. As with Table 
2, there are three different estimations, but the number of Columns is multiplied by two, since 
we first present the old specification with the sample reduction and then we introduce the new 
variables. 
Comparing the old specification after the sample reduction, Columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table A.4 
in the Appendix, which correspond to Column 1, 2 and 3 of Table 2, respectively, we can see 
that the results for the type class dummy coefficients are approximately equal in terms of 
significance but smaller in magnitude. The smallest and highest coefficient is 0.0361 and 
0.0906 for private class respectively, and the only significant coefficient for CA class from 
the Columns mentioned above is 0.00923, thus below the 0.0105 from Column 3 of Table 2. 
However, when we add Mother’s Education, M.SECONDARY and M.HIGHEREDUC, and 
student’s access to Computer and Internet at Home, Columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table A.4, the 
coefficients of PRIVCLASS7th and PRIVCLASS7to9th decrease 1.4 p.p. from Column 1 to 
Column 2; 0.76 p.p. from Column 3 to Column 4; and 0.87 p.p. from Column 5 to Column 6, 
                                                          
20 Students that were already in public schools in our observed school grades (6th to 9th) we collected data for the 
7th grade, the first school year of Lower Secondary School 
21 The majority of private school students were lost after adding Parent’s Education and Home Resources 
22 Find the description of the variables in Table A.1: Section C (Appendix)  
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whereas the coefficients for CACLASS7th and CACLASS7to9th increase by 0.34 p.p. and 
become statistically significant at 10% from Column 1 to Column 2; and increases 0.2 p.p. 
from Column 5 to 6.  
The results from Table A.4 are therefore robust to the introduction of new variables that were 
not present in prior specifications, and to a smaller sample. Note that FAMILYSUBSIDY7th, 
with the introduction of Mother’s Education and Home Resources, loses magnitude (between 
0.7 and 1 p.p.).  
In Table A.5 (Appendix), we present new estimations after excluding private class students, 
as they were a small group of students after the introduction of Mother’s Education and Home 
Resources. Overall results are not altered, with the exception of the coefficient CACLASS7th 
from Column 1 to Column 2 that remains not statistically different from zero, after the 
introduction of new variables.  
Moving to the Achievement Value-Added measure, in Table A.6 (Appendix) we present the 
results of the previous specification combined with the reduction of the sample, and the new 
specification. In Columns 1 and 3 (Mathematics) and Columns 5 and 7 (Portuguese), it is 
possible to observe for both subjects that the effect of attending either a CA class or private 
class, compared to public class, upon the 9th grade national exam scores has decreased with 
the new estimations, i.e. with the reduction of the sample from Table 3. However, as with the 
results obtained for the Probability of Graduation on Time, the introduction of Mother’s 
Education and home access to studying resources, increases the impact of attending CA class, 
compared to public school, and decreases the impact of attending private class compared to 
public class. The results are the same whether we consider 9th grade attendance or 7th to 9th 
grade attendance.  
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Therefore, we can conclude that after introducing Mother’s Education and Home Resources, 
belonging to a CA class during Lower Secondary School, on average, ceteris paribus, 
increases national exam scores by 3.2 points and 1.47 points for Mathematics and Portuguese 
respectively, compared to a public class. Thus, the results are approximately the same 
compared to those obtained in Table 3, before the robustness checks.  
The most important change from the estimations reported in Table A.6, is in the impact of 
attending a private class, after the introduction of Mother’s Education and Home Resources. 
The coefficients from PRIVCLASS9th and PRIVCLASS7to9th remain positive but decrease by 
as much as 3 points for both subjects (Columns 2, 4, 6 , 9 of Table A.6), compared to Table 
3, and approximately 1.2 points for Mathematics and 0.9 points for Portuguese subject, 
compared to the old specification with the new sample in Table A.6, Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7.  
These results may suggest that not only can Mother’s Education (and Parent’s in general) play 
an important role in the performance of children at school, but also present evidence that after 
accounting for this factor, the gap between national exam scores of public class students and 
private class students is substantially reduced. 
In Table A.7 in the Appendix, we present new estimations without private class students, for 
the same reasons explained above, and the results seem to be unchanged. 
VII. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The goal of this research was to compare the effectiveness of private schools, relative to 
public schools, at class level, in Portugal, with particular interest in separating publicly funded 
private schools (CA schools in Portugal) from strictly private schools. Considering Rosado 
and Seabra (2015): whereas in their study, the probability of being retained at least once is 
higher in CA schools than in public schools, in our study we find a positive effect (9.47% and 
1.05%) on the probability of completing Lower Secondary School without any retention, for 
24 
 
those students attending a private class and a CA class respectively, when compared to those 
attending a public class (7th to 9th grade). An explanation for the difference in our results may 
be the different set of controls that we employed and the fact that we controlled for the 
baseline scores (6th grade). After introducing Mother’s Education and Home Studying 
Resources, the coefficients remained positive and changed slightly in favor of CA class 
relative to public class (1.15%), and to the detriment of private class relative to public class 
(8.19%).  
Regarding students’ performance in standardized scores at 9th grade, we corroborate their 
findings of the positive impact of attending both CA class and private class, when compared 
to public class. After controlling for Mother’s Education and Home Studying Resources, on 
average, studying in a CA class from the 7th to 9th grade increases national exam score by 3.2 
points and 1.47 points, for Mathematics and Portuguese subject respectively, compared to a 
student in a public class. For a private class, the coefficient is even higher (5.6 and 3.7, 
respectively for Mathematics and Portuguese subject), suggesting that students in private 
classes outperform both students in CA classes and public classes. 
Despite the results obtained in favor of publicly funded private schools in Portugal compared 
to public schools in terms of effectiveness, in order to determine the school choice outcome 
should be publicly funded private schools (CA schools) in preference to public schools, one 
must also consider the annual average cost of each student at the different types of schools or 
classes which exist. The report from Tribunal de Contas23, carried out in 2012, calculates the 
annual average student cost in both CA school and public school for the school year 2009/10 
and provides evidence that financing students in publicly funded private schools is cheaper 
than in public schools. In values, they estimate the annual average cost of a student in a 
                                                          
23 An independent agency that is responsible for auditing, inspecting and studying expenditures in different areas 
of the Portuguese government 
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publicly funded private school to be 4.522€, compared to 4.648€ in a public school. However, 
this estimate suffers from several limitations due to the lack of available data and the 
methodologies used. Therefore, we do not infer that the government should choose either to 
increase or to decrease the investment in CA schools. However, the results of our study, 
provide evidence that, with respect to effectiveness, students in publicly funded private 
schools outperform students in public schools. Nevertheless, more studies are required, in 
particular to estimate the costs of financing a student in each type of class.  
References 
Coleman, J. S., Kilgore, S. B. and Hoffer, T. (1982) ‘Public and private schools’, Society, 19(2), pp. 4–
9. doi: 10.1007/BF02712901. 
Epple, D. and Romano, R. (2002) Educational Vouchers and Cream Skimming. 9354. 
Ferreira, R. (2015) ‘The determinants of teacher effectiveness in Portuguese schools’, (710). 
Flaker, A. (2014) ‘School management and efficiency: An assessment of charter vs. traditional public 
schools’, International Journal of Educational Development. Elsevier Ltd, 39, pp. 235–246. doi: 
10.1016/j.ijedudev.2014.07.001. 
Grosskopf, S., Hayes, K. J. and Taylor, L. L. (2009) ‘The relative efficiency of charter schools’, 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 80(1), pp. 67–87. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
8292.2008.00381.x. 
Hanushek, E. A. et al. (2007) ‘Charter school quality and parental decision making with school 
choice’, Journal of Public Economics, 91(5–6), pp. 823–848. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.09.014. 
Hanushek, E. A. et al. (2015) ‘The Next Urban Renaissance: How Public-Policy Innovation and 
Evaluation Can Improve Life in America’s Cities’, in, p. 88. 
Jimenez, E., Lockheed, M. E. and Paqueo, V. (1991) ‘the Relative Efficiency of Private and Public 
Schools in Developing Countries’, The World Bank Research Observer, 6(2), pp. 205–218. doi: 
10.1093/wbro/6.2.205. 
Mancebón, M.-J. et al. (2010) ‘Efficiency of public and publicly-subsidized high schools in Spain. 
Evidence from PISA 2006’, (25162). 
Noell, J. A. Y. (2012) ‘Public and Catholic Schools : A Reanalysis of “ Public and Private Schools ” 
Author ( s ): Jay Noell Reviewed work ( s ): Published by : American Sociological Association Stable 
URL : http://www.jstor.org/stable/2112292 . PUBLIC AND CATHOLIC SCHOOLS : A R’, 
Sociology The Journal Of The British Sociological Association, 55(2), pp. 123–132. 
Rosado, M. and Seabra, M. C. (2015) ‘Public and Private school management systems : a comparative 
analysis’. 
Sass, T. R. (2006) ‘Charter Schools and Student Achievement in Florida’, Education Finance and 
Policy, 1(1), pp. 91–122. doi: 10.1162/edfp.2006.1.1.91. 
Todd, P. E. and Wolpin, K. I. (2003) ‘On the specification and estimation of the production function 




Table A.1: General Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION OBS MIN MAX MEAN STD.DEV 
SECTION A: 
Achievement Measures 
      
SCORE9THMATH 
9th grade national exam score 
(Mathematics) 
89 750 0 100 50.77 26.09 
SCORE9THPT 
9th grade national exam score 
(Portuguese) 
89 750 3 100 59.12 15.04 
COMPLETEIN3YEARS 
If the student completed 7th to 
9th grade in three years 
89 750 0 1 0.79 0.41 
SECTION B: 
Independent Variables 
      
SCORE6THMATH 
6th grade national exam score 
(Mathematics) 
89 750 0 100 56.16 23.25 
SCORE6THPT 
6th grade national exam score 
(Portuguese) 
89 750 1 100 60.85 15.88 
FAMILYSUBSIDY7TH 
If student’s family received 
social support in 7th grade 
89 750 0 1 0.41 0.49 
PUBCLASS7TH 
If the student attends a public 
class in the 7th grade 
89 750 0 1 0.88 0.32 
CACLASS7TH 
If the student attends a 
publicly funded private class in 
the 7th grade 
89 750 0 1 0.069 0.25 
PRIVCLASS7TH 
If the student attends a private 
class in the 7th grade 
89 750 0 1 0.048 0.21 
PUBCLASS7TO9TH 
If the student attends a public 
class between the 7th and the 
9th grade 
74 638 0 1 0.88 0.32 
CACLASS7TO9TH 
If the student attends a 
publicly funded private class 
between the 7th and the 9th 
grade 
74 638 0 1 0.069 0.25 
PRIVCLASS7TO9TH 
If the student attends a private 
class between the 7th and the 
9th grade 
74 638 0 1 0.05 0.22 
MALE If the student is male 89 750 0 1 0.5 0.5 
AGE6TH Age of the student at 6th grade 89 750 9.15 18.54 11.4 0.55 
PORTUGUESE If the student is Portuguese 89 750 0 1 0.98 0.15 
MOVESCHOOL6TO7TH 
If the student moved school 
from 6th to the 7th grade 
89 750 0 1 0.25 0.43 
SECTION C: 
Robust Variables 
      
M.SECONDARY 
If the student’s Mother has a 
Secondary School degree 
72 650 0 1 0.42 0.49 
M.HIGHEREDUC 
If the student’s Mother has a 
Higher Education degree 
72 650 0 1 0.18 0.39 
COMPUTER 
If the student has home access 
to Computer 
72 650 0 1 0.73 0.44 
INTERNET 
If the student has home access 
to Internet 






















Table A.3: School district per type of school and per school grade 
 
Table A.4: Robust Specification - Marginal effects of the probability of graduation on time 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
SCORE6thMATH 0.00614*** 0.00587*** 0.00366*** 0.00352*** 0.00362*** 0.00348*** 
 (7.41e-05) (7.52e-05) (7.33e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.33e-05) (7.39e-05) 
SCORE6thPT 0.00380*** 0.00367*** 0.00272*** 0.00265*** 0.00269*** 0.00262*** 
 (0.000106) (0.000105) (9.67e-05) (9.65e-05) (9.66e-05) (9.63e-05) 
FAMILYSUBSIDY7th -0.0387*** -0.0260*** -0.0207*** -0.0139*** -0.0209*** -0.0140*** 
 (0.00257) (0.00264) (0.00231) (0.00237) (0.00230) (0.00236) 
CACLASS7th 0.00737 0.0108* 0.00210 0.00416 - - 
 (0.00599) (0.00598) (0.00498) (0.00499)   
PRIVCLASS7th 0.0781*** 0.0641*** 0.0361** 0.0285 - - 
 (0.0236) (0.0237) (0.0184) (0.0184)   
CACLASS7to9th - - - - 0.00923* 0.0115** 
     (0.00521) (0.00521) 
PRIVCLASS7to9th - - - - 0.0906*** 0.0819*** 
     (0.0279) (0.0282) 
MALE(Male=1) -0.0484*** -0.0500*** -0.0268*** -0.0278*** -0.0267*** -0.0277*** 
 (0.00251) (0.00250) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00223) 
AGE6th -0.0384*** -0.0346*** -0.0147*** -0.0126*** -0.0143*** -0.0122*** 
 (0.00232) (0.00231) (0.00238) (0.00237) (0.00237) (0.00237) 
PORTUGUESE(PT=1) -0.0110 -0.00848 -0.0132 -0.0124 -0.0126 -0.0119 
 (0.00915) (0.00921) (0.00858) (0.00861) (0.00851) (0.00855) 
MOVESCHOOL6to7th -0.00656** -0.00986*** 0.00227 0.000415 0.00230 0.000403 
 (0.00295) (0.00295) (0.00269) (0.00269) (0.00268) (0.00268) 
+M.SECONDARY - 0.0344*** - 0.0185*** - 0.0195*** 
  (0.00325)  (0.00287)  (0.00287) 
+M.HIGHEREDUC - 0.0569*** - 0.0280*** - 0.0286*** 
  (0.00572)  (0.00478)  (0.00484) 
+COMPUTER - 0.00922** - 0.00674** - 0.00681** 
  (0.00379)  (0.00342)  (0.00341) 
+INTERNET - 0.00345 - -0.000476 - -0.000793 
  (0.00359)  (0.00322)  (0.00322) 
School District Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 72,650 72,650 61,894 61,894 61,183 61,183 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3189 0.3244 0.2289 0.2326 0.2303 0.2343 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




9TH GRADE  
SCHOOL DISTRICT CA PRIV PUB TOTAL CA PRIV PUB TOTAL CA PRIV PUB TOTAL 
1 - AVEIRO 8 6 79 93 8 6 78 0 8 4 67 79 
2 - BEJA 2 1 27 30 2 0 27 30 2 1 26 29 
3 - BRAGA 8 8 84 100 8 8 82 100 8 9 84 101 
4 - BRAGANÇA 2 0 21 23 2 0 21 23 2 0 21 23 
5 - CASTELO BRANCO 4 0 25 29 4 0 25 29 4 0 24 28 
6 - COIMBRA 13 4 49 66 12 3 51 66 12 2 45 59 
7 - ÉVORA 0 2 23 25 0 2 23 25 0 2 21 23 
8 - FARO 0 4 56 60 0 4 57 60 0 4 56 60 
9 - GUARDA 4 0 24 28 4 0 23 28 4 0 21 25 
10 - LEIRIA 16 0 43 59 16 0 4 59 16 0 43 59 
11 - LISBOA 5 60 177 242 5 59 174 242 5 57 159 221 
12 - PORTALEGRE 0 1 22 23 0 1 21 23 0 1 21 22 
13 - PORTO 2 36 165 203 2 35 164 203 2 34 155 191 
14 - SANTARÉM 4 0 52 56 4 0 52 56 4 0 47 51 
15 - SETÚBAL 0 9 85 94 0 9 82 94 0 7 79 86 
16 - VIANA DO CASTELO 2 2 25 29 2 2 25 29 2 2 23 27 
17 - VILA REAL 2 0 25 27 2 0 25 27 2 0 25 27 
18 - VISEU 3 2 54 59 3 1 51 59 3 1 46 50 
TOTAL SCHOOLS 75 135 1 036 1 246 74 130 1 024 1 246 74 124 963 1 161 
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Table A.5: Robust Specification (without private class students) - Marginal effects of the probability of graduation on 
time 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
SCORE6thMATH 0.00619*** 0.00592*** 0.00370*** 0.00356*** 0.00366*** 0.00351*** 
 (7.46e-05) (7.57e-05) (7.40e-05) (7.46e-05) (7.38e-05) (7.44e-05) 
SCORE6thPT 0.00382*** 0.00368*** 0.00272*** 0.00265*** 0.00270*** 0.00263*** 
 (0.000107) (0.000106) (9.75e-05) (9.72e-05) (9.72e-05) (9.69e-05) 
FAMILYSUBSIDY7th -0.0390*** -0.0262*** -0.0211*** -0.0142*** -0.0211*** -0.0141*** 
 (0.00259) (0.00266) (0.00233) (0.00239) (0.00232) (0.00238) 
CACLASS7th 0.00634 0.00985 0.00136 0.00344 - - 
 (0.00605) (0.00605) (0.00503) (0.00504)   
-PRIVCLASS7th - - - - - - 
       
CACLASS7to9th - - - - 0.00927* 0.0116** 
     (0.00524) (0.00525) 
-PRIVCLASS7to9th - - - - - - 
       
MALE(Male=1) -0.0489*** -0.0505*** -0.0271*** -0.0281*** -0.0270*** -0.0281*** 
 (0.00253) (0.00252) (0.00226) (0.00226) (0.00225) (0.00225) 
AGE6th -0.0386*** -0.0348*** -0.0147*** -0.0127*** -0.0141*** -0.0120*** 
 (0.00234) (0.00233) (0.00240) (0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00238) 
PORTUGUESE(PT=1) -0.0109 -0.00826 -0.0133 -0.0124 -0.0123 -0.0116 
 (0.00922) (0.00928) (0.00864) (0.00868) (0.00857) (0.00860) 
MOVESCHOOL6to7th -0.00677** -0.0101*** 0.00219 0.000283 0.00215 0.000224 
 (0.00297) (0.00297) (0.00271) (0.00271) (0.00270) (0.00270) 
+M.SECONDARY - 0.0346*** - 0.0186*** - 0.0195*** 
  (0.00328)  (0.00289)  (0.00289) 
+M.HIGHEREDUC - 0.0583*** - 0.0289*** - 0.0292*** 
  (0.00581)  (0.00487)  (0.00489) 
+COMPUTER - 0.00920** - 0.00677** - 0.00689** 
  (0.00382)  (0.00344)  (0.00344) 
+INTERNET - 0.00344 - -0.000547 - -0.000823 
  (0.00361)  (0.00325)  (0.00324) 
School District Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 71,816 71,816 61,112 61,112 60,693 60,693 
Pseudo R-squared 0.319 0.3246 0.2289 0.2327 0.2295 0.2336 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 












Table A.6: Robust Achievement Value-Added estimation results 
         
VARIABLES (1) MAT (2) MAT (3) MAT (4) MAT (5) PT (6) PT (7) PT (8) PT 
         
SCORE6th 0.858*** 0.824*** 0.859*** 0.825*** 0.593*** 0.567*** 0.594*** 0.567*** 
 (0.00325) (0.00342) (0.00326) (0.00344) (0.00349) (0.00355) (0.00351) (0.00357) 
FAMILYSUBSIDY7th -3.290*** -1.809*** -3.286*** -1.806*** -2.000*** -0.927*** -2.003*** -0.923*** 
 (0.144) (0.150) (0.145) (0.151) (0.0958) (0.100) (0.0963) (0.101) 
CACLASS9th 2.590*** 3.061*** - - 1.004*** 1.288*** - - 
 (0.276) (0.276)   (0.189) (0.188)   
PRIVCLASS9th 6.825*** 5.588*** - - 3.939*** 2.979*** - - 
 (0.624) (0.629)   (0.471) (0.466)   
CACLASS7to9th - - 2.644*** 3.176*** - - 1.145*** 1.470*** 
   (0.286) (0.286)   (0.196) (0.195) 
PRIVCLASS7to9th - - 6.728*** 5.590*** - - 4.583*** 3.685*** 
   (0.714) (0.723)   (0.538) (0.530) 
MALE -2.400*** -2.451*** -2.391*** -2.438*** -2.561*** -2.730*** -2.560*** -2.728*** 
 (0.132) (0.131) (0.133) (0.132) (0.0915) (0.0908) (0.0920) (0.0913) 
AGE6th -3.239*** -2.947*** -3.220*** -2.929*** -1.817*** -1.566*** -1.831*** -1.578*** 
 (0.162) (0.161) (0.163) (0.162) (0.114) (0.113) (0.115) (0.114) 
MOVESCHOOL6to7th 0.368** -0.0442 0.395** -0.0163 0.0446 -0.244** 0.0480 -0.242** 
 (0.156) (0.155) (0.157) (0.156) (0.107) (0.106) (0.108) (0.107) 
PORTUGUESE(PT=1) 1.022* 1.067* 1.072* 1.102* 0.523 0.578 0.541 0.584 
 (0.578) (0.576) (0.581) (0.578) (0.373) (0.371) (0.376) (0.374) 
EXAMYEAR9th (2016=1) -5.572*** -5.402*** -5.478*** -5.307*** -3.642*** -3.358*** -3.619*** -3.328*** 
 (0.223) (0.221) (0.225) (0.224) (0.149) (0.148) (0.151) (0.150) 
+M.SECONDARY - 1.912*** - 1.901*** - 1.389*** - 1.413*** 
  (0.171)  (0.172)  (0.115)  (0.115) 
+M.HIGHEREDUC - 4.342*** - 4.379*** - 2.930*** - 2.939*** 
  (0.198)  (0.199)  (0.140)  (0.141) 
+COMPUTER - 0.351 - 0.321 - 0.114 - 0.157 
  (0.220)  (0.222)  (0.148)  (0.149) 
+INTERNET - 0.864*** - 0.882*** - 0.557*** - 0.540*** 
  (0.202)  (0.204)  (0.136)  (0.136) 
Constant 37.53*** 33.53*** 37.21*** 33.26*** 43.09*** 40.13*** 43.19*** 40.20*** 
 (2.023) (2.015) (2.037) (2.029) (1.414) (1.410) (1.425) (1.421) 
School District Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 61,894 61,894 61,183 61,183 61,894 61,894 61,183 61,183 
R-squared 0.594 0.602 0.594 0.602 0.423 0.434 0.424 0.435 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 







Table A.7: Robust Achievement Value-Added estimation results (without private class) 
VARIABLES (1) MAT (2) MAT (3) MAT (4) MAT (5) PT (6) PT (7) PT (8) PT 
         
SCORE6th 0.858*** 0.825*** 0.859*** 0.825*** 0.592*** 0.566*** 0.593*** 0.566*** 
 (0.00326) (0.00344) (0.00327) (0.00345) (0.00351) (0.00357) (0.00352) (0.00358) 
FAMILYSUBSIDY7th -3.299*** -1.805*** -3.291*** -1.796*** -2.002*** -0.926*** -2.007*** -0.928*** 
 (0.145) (0.151) (0.145) (0.151) (0.0960) (0.101) (0.0963) (0.101) 
CACLASS9th 2.581*** 3.072*** - - 1.021*** 1.317*** - - 
 (0.278) (0.278)   (0.190) (0.190)   
-PRIVCLASS9th - - - - - - - - 
         
CACLASS7to9th - - 2.639*** 3.176*** - - 1.143*** 1.468*** 
   (0.286) (0.286)   (0.196) (0.195) 
-PRIVCLASS7to9th - - - - - - - - 
         
MALE -2.404*** -2.454*** -2.408*** -2.455*** -2.573*** -2.743*** -2.576*** -2.745*** 
 (0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.132) (0.0920) (0.0913) (0.0923) (0.0916) 
AGE6th -3.221*** -2.925*** -3.192*** -2.896*** -1.808*** -1.555*** -1.822*** -1.569*** 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.164) (0.163) (0.114) (0.114) (0.115) (0.114) 
MOVESCHOOL6to7th 0.386** -0.0329 0.406*** -0.0108 0.0526 -0.238** 0.0591 -0.231** 
 (0.157) (0.155) (0.157) (0.156) (0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.107) 
PORTUGUESE(PT=1) 1.020* 1.068* 1.095* 1.127* 0.533 0.592 0.534 0.580 
 (0.580) (0.578) (0.582) (0.579) (0.374) (0.372) (0.377) (0.374) 
EXAMYEAR9th (2016=1) -5.534*** -5.369*** -5.490*** -5.318*** -3.644*** -3.363*** -3.620*** -3.332*** 
 (0.224) (0.222) (0.226) (0.224) (0.150) (0.149) (0.151) (0.150) 
+M.SECONDARY - 1.893*** - 1.900*** - 1.405*** - 1.415*** 
  (0.172)  (0.173)  (0.115)  (0.116) 
+M.HIGHEREDUC - 4.431*** - 4.445*** - 2.918*** - 2.926*** 
  (0.200)  (0.200)  (0.142)  (0.142) 
+COMPUTER - 0.321 - 0.314 - 0.113 - 0.150 
  (0.222)  (0.223)  (0.149)  (0.149) 
+INTERNET - 0.895*** - 0.894*** - 0.568*** - 0.545*** 
  (0.204)  (0.204)  (0.136)  (0.137) 
Constant 37.35*** 33.32*** 36.90*** 32.90*** 43.07*** 40.07*** 43.18*** 40.18*** 
 (2.032) (2.025) (2.042) (2.034) (1.421) (1.418) (1.428) (1.424) 
School District Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 61,112 61,112 60,693 60,693 61,112 61,112 60,693 60,693 
R-squared 0.593 0.600 0.593 0.601 0.422 0.433 0.422 0.434 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
